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THE FATE OF DOMESTIC EXPORTERS UNDER THE BYRD
AMENDMENT AS CASE STUDY FOR RESUSCITATING
LAST-IN-TIME TREATY INTERPRETATION
ANDREW PLATT∗
I. INTRODUCTION
United States trade policy is necessarily influenced by powerful
political and economic interests but is also bound by national and
international law. When foreign importers believe they have been
harmed by U.S. policy, international principles support and national
law provides the right to claim redress in the U.S. courts. However,
due to U.S. trade policies that contravene treaty obligations, it may be
argued that aggrieved domestic exporters are not provided with a
remedy. This comment illustrates what effect adopting one of the
competing schools of treaty interpretation would have on the case
study “the 2000 Byrd Amendment in the WTO Appellate body in 2003
and in the U.S. Court of International Trade in 2006.” This Comment
argues that harmed domestic exporters will only have a remedy if
courts honor the last-in-time rule of treaty reconciliation because,
absent this doctrine, Constitutional protections against takings are
insufficient in light of the taxing and spending power.
Known as the Byrd Amendment, the Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSO) distributes funds collected from
antidumping duties to U.S. companies who make successful dumping
complaints.1 For instance, steel importers who undercut U.S. market
prices are charged with dumping penalties, as would occur in any
country; and then according to the Byrd Amendment, the amount
charged will be distributed back to the U.S. producers who
complained. The intent behind the CDSO is to support companies
threatened by overseas competition. However, it creates a problem
when the anti-dumping duties bring imports up to market value,
because the subsequent payments subsidize the American producers
that are no longer at an unfair disadvantage.
When the United States signed the treaty establishing the WTO, it
agreed to follow certain rules. The WTO claims that the CDSO breaks

∗
1

J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University (2007).
19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000).
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the rules that the United States committed to follow. Although the
WTO has no power to legislate for any country,2 it allows other
member countries to hit back by charging a tariff equal to the illegal
payments. These countries, including several of America’s favorite
trade partners—the EU, Canada, Mexico, and Japan—may pick their
targets so as to motivate the United States to play by the rules.
The EU targets, among other imports, fabrics and shoes.3 It
charges a proportional duty to U.S. exports to compensate for the
payments made to U.S. companies under the Byrd Amendment. For
example, the EU will charge a fifteen percent duty on American
shoemakers every time the United States charges duties on other
European companies and gives the proceeds of those duties to
American steel companies. Simplified to its essence, whenever U.S.
steel producers receive the proceeds of a duty, U.S. shoemakers must
pay—and they are not happy about it. Now that Congress
acknowledged the illegitimacy of the act, exporters will be even
angrier, but these companies—who are doing nothing wrong—will
continue to pay duties through 2008, and likely into the future.
What remedies do the shoemakers or any of the “innocent”
companies have? Since they remain trapped between the international
law and domestic law, they must rely on domestic courts to harmonize
the two. Regardless of the WTO’s interpretation, the enactment of the
CDSO was clearly legal in the United States. On this plane, legality
simply means it is constitutional within Congress’ enumerated Article
I power to regulate interstate commerce. At the same time, it is just as
clear that it is illegal on the international plane. Internationally, the
simplest category of illegal actions is direct treaty violations. But
where can a company bring a suit under international law? Or more
fundamentally, who could they sue? Individual corporations have no
standing in the international realm where abuses are resolved countryto-country or perhaps between a country and an international
organization. That is to say, bodies like the U.N. or the WTO possess
enough power to act with a set of limited powers to redress abuses. A
U.S. shoemaker who feels wrongfully harmed by the CDSO has no
recourse in the international plane. Nor does it have a representative
except—and here is the irony for the shoemaker—its own government.

2

John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports:
Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 112 (2004).
3
Communication of the European Communities, United States—Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 2, WT/DS217/47 (May 4, 2005) available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/217-47.doc.
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Therefore, an “innocent” U.S. company charged with retaliatory
duties would have to sue under U.S. law. The supremacy clause,
Article VI, includes treaties as the “supreme law of the land” along
with congressional legislation. On the face of it, a U.S. court must
consider the Byrd Amendment’s international illegality on one hand
and its domestic legality on the other. Fortunately, a common-law
solution exists for this apparent collision: the last-in-time rule. Thus,
when a treaty is in place first and Congress subsequently passes
“clearly contradictory” legislation, the latter is the “supreme” law.4
The collision of doctrines indicates that courts should evaluate the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the implementation and the
purposes of the treaty. In the case of the CDSO, the legislation can and
should be interpreted so as to give effect to the United States
international obligation and spare “innocent” domestic exporters.
To approach this novel question, this paper will assert that the U.S.
companies harmed by the CDSO’s illegality (subject to retaliatory
duties) must resist the recent erosion of the U.S. last-in-time
jurisprudence if they are to have any chance of relief in the courts. Part
II will describe the reasoning of the WTO decision against the CDSO.
Part III will explain the treatment of the CDSO in U.S. Courts and will
explore why the only viable remedy in light of the last-in-time canon
is the judicial redefinition of the CDSO.
II. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE APPELLATE
BODY REPORT
A. The WTO Dispute Resolution Process Defines International Law
Dumping is a distortion of free trade whereby a foreign company
attempts to undercut prices in a domestic market to drive out local
competition. To equalize prices, the importing country charges
antidumping duties—fees to bring the imported products up to market
value. The WTO oversees these actions so that disputes over
procedural fairness or the size of an antidumping duty do not escalate
into trade wars. If states are not able to resolve dumping disputes,
WTO/GATT treaties authorize a victim of unfair antidumping duties

4

In this context, “in place” is used as short hand to assume ratification for
Article II treaties or valid exercises of the foreign relations power for executive
agreements as well as being either self-executing or appropriately implemented. The
discussion of these issues is avoided as the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, P.L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4815 gives a clear date for when the treaty was “in place” as Dec.
8, 1994 (and thus entered into force Jan. 1, 1995).
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to charge countervailing duties—fees to compensate for excessive
antidumping duties.
The term, “countervailing duty,” suggests the intention to
counteract an imbalance; so where possible, the target should be the
same industry that is subject to unfair antidumping duties.5 Only where
this is determined to be ineffective are countries allowed to take action
against different industries through the principle of cross-retaliation.
Whereas compliance with most international agreements is motivated
only by the golden rule’s do-unto-others principles, the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism contains powerful consequences. Crossretaliatory countervailing duties are hit-where-it-hurts penalties
designed to fuel internal political pressure to bring a country in line
with its international obligations.
While the dispute process is conducted between countries, if
countervailing duties are awarded, it is the offending country’s
companies, not its government, who pay for it. The award is
conceptualized as a suspension of the benefits—the concessions—
normally made to the countries by virtue of their membership in the
WTO. By the award, the complaining countries may charge duties on
classes of goods from the offending country in the amounts approved
by a WTO arbitrator. They will continue to collect these duties from
the companies of the offending country in these industries until the
offender conforms to its commitments.6
In the hierarchy of international law, treaties are the strongest—or
at least the clearest—type of law,7 and the dispute resolution process
amounts to a legal interpretation of the states’ treaty obligations. Thus,
a WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) decision is a binding
determination of a breach of the treaty in dispute.8 That is to say, other
nations may treat the United States as a party in breach of nothing

5

Only Japan imported enough bearings and steel products to make imposing
countervailing duties on these imports, while other countries settled for crossretaliation. Japan Fines U.S. Exports to Protest Byrd, METAL CENTER NEWS, Aug.
2005, available at http://www.metalcenternews.com/2005/August/mcn0508Assoc.htm
#Japan.
6
And only that long. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, art. 22.8, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M 1125 (1194) [hereinafter DSU] available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/ 28-dsu.pdf.
7
Statute of the International Court of Justice 1946 U.N.Y.B. 843 at 846, 3
T.I.A.S. 1179, ch. II, art 38; Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 101 (1986).
8
DSU arts. 19, 22.
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more than a WTO finding. Nevertheless, because the U.S. courts have
created their own rules on the effect of international law, they would
likely scrutinize a WTO Appellate Body report for themselves.9
B. The Complaint and DSB Report
The complaining parties convinced the DSB panel10 that the
CDSO was mandatory legislation that violated the basic remedy
provisions of the free trade agreement inasmuch as it was a “specific
action”11 under Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement12 (AD)
and Article 32.1 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement13 (SCM). Although these complaints were the heart of the
dispute, the fact that parties further argued—and the DSB found—that
the CDSO payments amounted to procedural distortions, encouraging
a larger segment of an industry to band-wagon (violating Article 5.4 of
the AD Agreement and Article 11.4 of the SCM Agreement14). The
DSB panel did not agree with the complaining parties that the
incentives in turn illegally prevented the accused importer from having
a fair opportunity to cure the violation. The panel reported that

9
For example, the Appellate Body report articulated an expanded reading of an
essential aspect of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement in this case,
and, given the tendency of U.S. courts to engage in intent-based treaty interpretation it
might question whether this expanded interpretation represents the treaty that the
United States intended to sign. See John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the
Constitution and the Rule of Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 163, 174 (2001).
10
Panel Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000, ¶ 4.86,WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R (Sep. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Panel Report],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/cases_e/ds217_e.htm
(follow “Panel Report” hyperlink; then follow language code “E” hyperlink).
11
That is, import regulations are permissible if provided for in the treaty or
incidental to imports, but not when they are targeted, or “specific.”
12
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter AD Agreement] available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf. The only difference between the two provisions is
the reference to dumping in the AD agreement and subsidies in the SCM agreement.
13
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCM
Agreement] available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf;
Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 3.2–3.3.
14
These provisions use similar language to define the (only) permissible
procedures for commencing an investigation.
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because the text of the CDSO harmonized with the statistical
thresholds of AD 5.4 and SCM 11.4, and because there was no
indication that the amendment was implemented in a manner contrary
to the two articles, the United States was not accountable for its
possible motives in denying a proposal for cure (an “undertaking”).15
The complaining countries alleged, as they must when asking for
countervailing duties, that these violations “nullif[y] or impair[]
benefits accruing them” under WTO agreements. This allegation
presumes they are harmed by being deprived of what, under the treaty,
they are entitled to—namely, the “benefit” of a certain level of access
to the U.S. markets. In finding that the CDSO eliminated or interfered
with the agreed conditions, the DSB panel held that complaining
parties had a right to compensatory (i.e. retaliatory) duties. Likewise,
because the CDSO constituted “specific action,” it further violated the
United States’ agreement to conform its domestic law with the WTO
treaties it signed.16
C. The Appellate Report
Faced with millions of dollars of retaliatory duties on its
companies’ annual exports, the United States appealed the DSB’s
determination that the CDSO was a “specific action” against dumping
and subsidization and that it illegally encouraged dumping complaints.
To avoid retaliatory countervailing duties, it had to persuade the
Appellate Body on both issues, for either one would represent nonconformity with international commitments and thereby nullify or
impair benefits of the complaining parties. In the end, the United
States succeeded only in convincing the Appellate Body to reverse the
unfair complaint procedure determination. However, in affirming the
DSB panel’s “specific action” finding, the Appellate Body rejected the
panel’s determinations of law and substituted its own. Further, the
U.S. appeal successfully eliminated overly-broad language used in the
DSB report.

15

Panel Report, supra note 10, at ¶ 3.3. The U.S. also prevailed on two other
issues. India and Indonesia asserted that the CDSO further violated their special WTO
status as developing countries under AD 5, but failed on procedural grounds. Mexico
boldly alleged that the CDSO was not only a “specific action,” but rose to the level of
a subsidy under SCM 5. Mexico failed to convince the DSB that it was such a direct
violation of the central values of the WTO agreement.
16
Embodied in AD Agreement art. 18.4 and SCM Agreement art. 32.5.
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The U.S. appeal forced a clarification of the meaning in AD 18.117
and SCM 32.118 of a “specific action against” dumping or subsidy.
The Appellate Body described the “specific action against” language
as condition precedent for the applicability of these provisions. If a
challenged measure were neither a “specific action” nor “against”
dumping/subsidization, it would escape the analysis under Article 18.1
of the AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. Any
measure that is both specific and against dumping/subsidization must
fit within the GATT agreements. At first glance, the very title of the
Byrd Amendment, the Continuing Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act,
suggested an action against dumping and subsidization; however,
neither the DSB panel nor the Appellate Body relied on this,19 and the
U.S. appeal pushed the Appellate Body to define the important terms
of the treaty.
1. “Specific Action”
While the principle of stare decisis is not incorporated into the
WTO system, the “governing” Appellate interpretation of the treaty
language comes from the 2000 decision in United States—Anti-

17
No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be
taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this
Agreement. This in not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of
GATT 1994, as appropriate.
18
No specific action against a subsidy of another Member can be taken except in
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement. This
paragraph is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of
GATT 1994, where appropriate.
19
But the DSB panel was tempted to. Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 7.27. The
Congressional findings attached to the Byrd Amendments explicitly provided, “United
States unfair trade laws have as their purpose the restoration of conditions of fair trade
so that jobs and investment that should be in the United States are not lost through the
false market signals.” Congressional Findings, P.L. 106-387, § 1(a), 114 Stat. 1549
(emphasis added).
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Dumping Act of 1916.20 The pre-WTO language at issue there targeted
predatory pricing without calling it “dumping.” Nevertheless, using a
“constituent elements” analysis, the Appellate Body found that
predatory pricing was using the same criteria as dumping. Because the
AD Agreement recited the only permissible anti-dumping remedies,
the additional step of giving the proceeds of the duties to competitors
was inconsistent with WTO agreements.
In its analysis of the CDSO, the Appellate Body found that the
CDSO embodied the constituent elements of dumping. Regardless of
what it was called, the CDSO was “inextricably linked to, and strongly
correlated with” dumping or subsidization investigations.21 The
Appellate Body seized on the substance of the CDSO, particularly the
mechanism that distributed payments only after duties had been
collected pursuant to an order. Because the CDSO clearly stated that
the anti-dumping or countervailing duty orders are imposed only
following a determination of dumping or countervailing duties, the
Appellate Body found that the Amendment was “inextricably linked”
to dumping/subsidization.
2. “Against”
The Appellate Body’s analysis of the “against” prong dismissed
the United States’ marshalling of various dictionary definitions of
“against,” but was more careful with the underlying challenge as to
whether a measure could be valid if it was only indirectly against
dumping/subsidization. The United States attempted to challenge the
DSB panel’s interpretation that “against” simply meant having “an
adverse bearing on dumping or subsidization”22 (indirect effects) and
suggested hostile or active (direct) opposition. The United States tried
to emphasize that the CDSO’s impact on dumping was merely
indirect, and channeling money to help threatened companies better
compete was quite different from a law that attacked the importation

20

Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS136/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000) available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds136_e.htm (follow “Appellate Body Report” hyperlink; then follow
language code “E” hyperlink).
21
Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 4.86, WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234/R (Jan. 16, 2003) [hereinafter
Appellate Report] available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds217_e.htm (follow “Appellate Body Report” hyperlink; then follow language code
“E” hyperlink); Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 242.
22
Id. ¶ 247.
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directly by fining distributors who resold dumped goods, for example.
The Appellate Body declined to limit the meaning of dumping to the
definitions advocated by the United States because both the AD and
SCM Agreements contemplated indirect actions by referring to
“measures” against dumping/subsidization as a practice.23 In contrast,
“[t]here is no express requirement that the measure must act against
the imported dumped product, or entities responsible for that
product.”24
After affirming the expanded meaning of “against,” the Appellate
Body moved quickly through the reasons why the CDSO met this
definition: (1) the Amendment offsets were financed by duties, (2) the
offsets were paid to the domestic companies who were “necessarily
competitors” of the parties subject to duties, (3) domestic companies
were eligible for offset payments based on “production of the same
product” triggering the duties, and (4) the absence of restrictions on
the use of the offset payments indicated that they may be used to gain
advantage over the foreign competitors.25
For foreign companies and countries, the obvious link between the
duties levied and the subsidies paid is an incentive to avoid dumping
or subsidization. Clearly, the U.S. competitors will be enriched by the
fines the exporters pay to the degree that these exporters sell goods at
prices below normal when the CDSO requires specific action against
dumping/subsidization.
The Appellate Body’s focus on the design and structure of the
Byrd Amendment stands in contrast with the panel report’s emphasis
on proven effects.26 One important thrust of the DSB’s analysis was
that the Byrd distributions created inhospitable “conditions of
competition.” Although the U.S. arguments forced the Appellate Body
to address and reject this analysis, the result does not improve the U.S.
situation in this case. In the end, it was much easier to find that the
CDSO was by design and structure against dumping/subsidization than
to prove that exports were actually harmed.
3. The footnotes
After deciding that the CDSO represented a specific action against
dumping/subsidization, the Appellate Body analyzed the U.S.’s radical

23
24
25
26

Id. ¶ 253.
Id. ¶ 251.
Id. ¶ 255.
Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 7.62–7.63.
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attempt to turn the test inside out before considering whether the
Amendment’s provisions were inconsistent with the WTO agreements.
The United States argued that the footnotes to the articles prohibiting
non-WTO remedies indicated that the agreements were non-exclusive
and allowed the type of subsidies the CDSO created.
The United States represented that these footnotes merely clarify
the hierarchy of WTO provisions by confining the exclusions in
Articles 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Article 32.1 of the SCM
Agreement to their respective realms. The AD Agreement, for
example, specifies “[n]o specific action against dumping of exports
from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the
provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.” Footnote
twenty four simply adds, “This is not intended to preclude action
under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994, as appropriate.” Thus,
even though other GATT measures naturally result in the inspections
of dumped goods, such connection with dumping is not sufficient to
bring an independent process in violation of the AD Agreement. The
United States was essentially arguing that “an action that [fell] within
Footnotes 24 and 56 [could not] be characterized as a specific action .
. . and such action would, therefore, not be WTO-inconsistent.”27
As background for the assertion that the footnotes overpower the
meaning of the main provisions, the United States argued that the AD
and SCM Agreements were non-exclusive. That is to say, even though
these agreements restricted measures using certain enumerated
strategies, an action such as the CDSO that did not fall into the
discrete categories was, by definition, not a “specific action.”
Although the Appellate Body was dismissive of this attempt (“this not
only turn[ed] the normal approach to interpretation on its head, but it
also [ran] counter to our finding in US–1916 Act”28), its refutation was
methodic—presumably laying down strong enough reasoning to
discourage future attempts to blow apart the WTO enforcement
system.
In its analysis of the prior arguments, the Appellate Body treated
the AD and SCM Agreements as complementary in construction and
object. While it eventually reached the same conclusion on the issue of
exclusivity, it did not assume their equivalence from the outset. Not
only did the nature of the three remedies treated in the AD Agreement
differ from the four ones in the SCM Agreement, the US–1916 Act
report only dealt with the former. Thus, while the dismissal of the

27
28
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argument based on Footnote 24 (the AD Agreement) took up only two
paragraphs, the question of Footnote 56 and the SCM Agreement
consumed four pages. Despite the differences in the scope of the
measures in the two agreements, the Appellate Body found that, by the
“terminology and structure,” the two agreements embodied the same
definitive “obligation or prohibition.”29 While the United States argued
that GATT permitted actions against subsidies not mentioned in the
SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body rejected this argument
independent of an analogy with the AD Agreement. The Appellate
Body interpreted the election of remedies requirement in Footnote 35
combined with Article 32.1 (“No specific action against a subsidy of
another Member can be taken except in accordance with the
provisions of GATT”30) as definitive. If, in order to win this dispute,
the United States had prevailed with the contention that the GATT
remedies were non-exclusive, the precedent would cause a hemorrhage
in the WTO enforcement system. If the agreements were suddenly
interpreted to be nonexclusive, any country could use creatively
structured duties and/or barriers to alter the landscape. This conclusion
then brought the analysis to a third step of the prohibition of specific
actions. In finding that GATT contained the only appropriate
responses to dumping and subsidization, it also determined that the
CDSO response was inconsistent.
The Appellate Body’s determination that the AD and SCM
Agreements resulted in an identical “obligation or prohibition” was
probably the most significant rule of the case31 but one that was not
necessary to trigger retaliatory duties. Whereas US–1916 Act clarified
the underlying principles but did not delineate the boundaries of AD
18.1 and SCM 32.1, the declaration that their reach was identical
removed this ambiguity.
The statement is useful, but is it non-binding dicta? In the WTO
system, the question of the violation is separate from the amount of
penalties. In our common law system, it makes sense for a court to
limit its determination to the issues that decide the outcome and
controversy before it so that the pronouncements that do not influence
the outcome are not binding on future cases. In this case, the penalties
are the same whether the CDSO violates only the AD Agreement or
the SCM Agreement or both. But because the process of determining

29

Appellate Report, supra note 21, ¶ 268.
Emphasis added.
31
Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2003, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 317, 344 (2004).
30
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penalties is separate from the determination of a violation by the
“reasonable” time to correct the violation, it is not only permissible for
the Appellate Body to make determinations that do not increase
penalties, it is essential for it to make a complete determination of the
State’s noncompliance. Only a full determination would particularize
the requirements of subsequent corrective action. The Appellate
Body’s pronouncement on the measures permitted by the SCM
Agreement is just as binding as any other decision—meaning that
while it is not “dicta,” it is still binding in that future disputes are
legally required to follow it. In the absence of stare decisis, it will be
followed in the future depending on the strength of its reasoning,
which is why a full analysis was employed.
4. Incentives and bad faith breach
Although the United States did not prevail on the central question
of “specific action,” the appeal eliminated the overly-broad holding of
the DSB panel regarding the discretion of customs officials and the
duty of good faith. The DSB panel was greatly influenced by the
evidence that the companies that would not have supported antidumping petitions changed their position in order to qualify for
potential Byrd Amendment distributions.32 Since GATT required that
a majority of an affected domestic industry support an investigation,
the DSB panel was concerned that the prospect of the CDSO
distribution was distorting this requirement and found that the
Amendment’s distributions were such powerful incentives that they
defeated the “object and purpose” of GATT. The Appellate Body was
critical of a resort to “object and purpose” when the plain language of
the CDSO complied exactly with the industry representation
requirements of GATT. While the DSB panel had gone so far as to
state that the CDSO “in effect mandate[d] domestic producers to
support [an] application,”33 the Appellate Body reversed both this
decision and the determination that the mere failure to implement the
GATT obligations constituted bad faith. Even though the elimination
of the unwarranted conclusions in the Panel Report did not decrease
the “reasonable amount of time” allowed for compliance,34 nor

32

Panel Report, supra note 10, ¶ 7.6; cf. Appellate Body Report, supra note 20,
¶¶ 284–85.
33
Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 293.
34
“Factors external to the legislative process itself are of no relevance for the
determination of the reasonable period of time for implementation.” Award of the
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increase the amount of “damages” the complaining parties might
receive,35 the elimination of these overly inclusive principles may have
been enough justification for an appeal even if the United States knew
it would lose on the other issues.36
The finding that the United States acted inconsistently with its
GATT obligations triggers two results. First, AD 18.4 and SCM 32.5
provide that each signatory “shall take all necessary steps” to integrate
GATT provisions into their own laws. This obligation applies to the
laws in place at the time of signing the Uruguay Accord as well as
subsequent laws. The United States broke its commitment in enacting
the Byrd Amendment, and a U.S. court would not find any grounds to
invalidate the finding. Second, the infringement of any obligation “is
considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment” of benefits that ought to accrue to other members.37 That
is to say, the violation itself triggers the relief without any
demonstration of harm. Because the GATT framework provides
significant tariff reductions on condition of mutual compliance, when
a member’s rights to the benefits are “impaired,” it may likewise
decline to extend the offending state the benefits of GATT
membership—according to WTO DSU principles.
D. The Aftermath
The Appellate Body report clarified the GATT treaty for future
cases. The final decision tightened the “specific action against” test,
eliminated poorly reasoned sections of the Panel Report, and collapsed
the analysis of the exclusivity of remedies under both the AD and
SCM Agreements. Of course, the case was also a real case and
controversy, although at the WTO a decision is not an executable court
order that triggers relief. The WTO has no power to impose legislation
on any member country, but it authorizes other countries to withhold

Arbitrator, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 24,
WT/DS217/14, WT/DS234/22 (Jun. 13, 2003) available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ ds217_e.htm (follow “Article 21.3(c) Arbitration
Report” hyperlink; then follow language code “E” hyperlink).
35
AD Agreement, supra note 12, art. 22.6; Decision by the Arbitrator, United
States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 3.47, WT/DS217/
ARB/EEC (Aug. 31, 2004) available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds217_e.htm (follow “Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report”
hyperlink; then follow language code “E” hyperlink).
36
Bhala & Gantz, supra note 31, at 346–47.
37
DSU art. 3.8.
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the benefits of a treaty until the non-complying member assumes all its
obligations. Once the CDSO was found to be inconsistent with U.S.’s
treaty obligations, the United States then had to return to compliance
within a “reasonable time” to avoid the benefit withholding.
If the United States failed to comply by December 27, 2003, the
complaining parties could seek authorization to “suspend concessions”
by charging the U.S. companies for the illegal CDSO distributions.38
On August 31, 2004, another arbitral panel set seventy-two percent as
the rate of the CDSO distributions that had come from their countries
and that they could now charge the U.S. companies.39 The
countervailing duty is triggered by the presumption that a violation of
an agreement is an “impairment or nullification,” not by the actual
calculation of damages. As trade negotiations failed to produce results
in 2005, the EU, Canada, Japan, and Mexico, each obtained approval
to collect countervailing duties on various products to motivate U.S.
compliance.40 These amounts vary by industry and destination but
were estimated to amount to at least $114 million for 2005.41
Throughout the process, the U.S.’s representatives have accepted
the legitimacy of the WTO’s authority in this dispute and the validity
of its treaty obligation. The dispute involved the meaning of the trade
agreement, not its validity or existence. Since the Appellate Body’s
finding, the United States has submitted regular reports to the DSB
appraising the progress of various bills to repeal the CDSO as they
advanced or failed through Congress.42 Each of these communications
reiterated the U.S.’s intent to comply with the WTO and recognized

38

Award of the Arbitrator, supra note 34, ¶ 83.
Decision by the Arbitrator (Canada), United States—Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 3.149, WT/DS234/ARB/CAN, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds234_e.htm (follow “Recourse
to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report” hyperlink; then follow language code “E”
hyperlinks); Decision by the Arbitrator (Mexico), United States—Continued Dumping
and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 3.151, WT/DS234/ARB/MEX (Aug. 31, 2004),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds234_e.htm
(follow “Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report” hyperlink; then follow language
code “E” hyperlinks).
40
Decision by the Arbitrator (Canada) ¶ 6.3.
41
Press Release, Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition, CITAC
Publishes 2005 ‘Byrd Amendment Millionaires Club;’ Payouts Total $226 Million in
2005, $1. 26 Billion Since 2001 (Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.citac.info/press/release/
2005/12_12.php.
42
Addenda one to twenty-two to Status Report by the United States, United
States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 WT/DS217/16,
WT/DS234/24 (Jan. 13, 2004).
39
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that it breached its international obligations. If a corporation took
responsibility in this way by recognizing their duty and breach, it
would have the effect of blood in the water, exciting a frenzy of claims
by anyone harmed by the breach. However, the United States is a state
actor in the realm of international trade where corporations have no
standing and no exporter subject to the countervailing duties can sue
there. May private domestic claims fail as well?
III. THE CDSO AND THE LAST-IN-TIME SUPREMACY CLAUSE
If a U.S. machinery manufacturer doing business in the EU called
its attorney after the suspension of concessions was published on
August 31, 2005, what would it have learned about the fifteen percent
duty it would suddenly have to pay? Should it sue at the WTO to get it
all reversed? Could it sue the ball-bearings producer across town
because it received the CDSO distributions that triggered the duties?
Could it sue the entire bearing industry for supporting the antidumping investigation? Should it sue the federal government, instead?
Is this a taking, or a tax?
Heedless of the plight of harmed domestic industries, Congress did
not repeal the CDSO until trading partners actually started charging
countervailing duties. This appears to be a tacit acknowledgment that
the CDSO was illegal—or at least ill-conceived—and as such the fact
that the U.S. companies will be paying countervailing duties for years
to come is an even greater incentive to sue.43 However, if there is
nowhere and no one to sue, the solutions must be purely political.

43

The language in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120
Stat. 4, § 7601(b) reads:
All duties on entries of goods made and filed before October 1,
2007, that would, but for subsection (a) of this section [the part
that repeals the CDSO], be distributed under section 754 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, shall be distributed as if section 754 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 had not been repealed by subsection (a).
This means that putatively dumped goods imported on September 30, 2007, for
example, will be subject to industry complaints as normal. If at the end of the many
months of investigation and then negotiation, the treasury receives anti-dumping
duties, it will still disperse half of the duties among the complaining U.S. companies
according to the Byrd Amendment—even if it takes until early 2009, for example.
This means that other countries will still be collecting countervailing duties from U.S.
exports through 2008, and possibly beyond, regardless of the repeal on February 8,
2006.
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The companies hit by retaliatory duties have a natural ally in the
foreign companies subject to antidumping duties in the United States
who see their payments handed to their competition. Foreign
companies suspect that the prospect of receiving a cut of eventual
antidumping duties entices the U.S. companies to initiate complaints
against them. In addition to the cost (and harassment) of defending
antidumping audits, when their U.S. competitors succeed, all those
duties go towards making the U.S. companies more formidable
competitors. A handful of foreign dumpers hit by the double force of
the CDSO have sued, alleging that the procedure unconstitutionally
transforms remedial antidumping duties into a punitive measure.44
Unfortunately, the Court of International Trade’s rejection of this
argument creates a significant hurdle for a challenge by an “innocent”
exporter.
A. The Treaty Power
The President and the Senate together have total control over the
conduct of foreign affairs through treaties. The United States acceded
to the Uruguay and Marrakesh accords by executive signature and the
“advice and consent” of the Senate. In addition to the senate approval,
GATT was implemented by federal statute.45 The added endorsement
of the House makes its application to domestic as well as international
affairs clearer than most Article II treaties.
While the Constitution has little to say about how the United
States behaves internationally, it certainly constrains government
behavior at home, regardless of what a treaty may say. Treaties are
agreements between states that may bear directly—even entirely—on
foreign issues, but it is equally possible, and increasingly common, for
international agreements to touch on domestic activities. For example,
if the President agrees by treaty to limit factory emissions to certain
amounts of sulfur compounds, then a government agency cannot
license a factory that does not meet the requirements.46 If it were to do
so, the agency could be sued for the harm caused. Likewise, an

44

Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1362
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2002), aff’d, 322 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
45
19 U.S.C. §§ 2501–624 (1994). An exploration of self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties is omitted in this note because of the clarity of the implementing
language.
46
This assumes, for the sake of simplicity, that the hypothetical treaty was an
Article II treaty, it received Senate advice and consent, and the treaty was selfexecuting, or the enabling legislation followed.
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individual hunter could be fined by a U.S. court under an international
wildlife protection treaty even if U.S. law did not specifically protect
the species hunted.47 More correctly, the treaty is U.S. law. The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that “the laws of the
United States . . . and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land.”48 It not only invalidates state laws that conflict with U.S.
treaties,49 but elevates treaties to the stature of federal law.
When the Supremacy Clause was conceived, treaties were
evidently believed to be superior to federal statutes. As Thomas
Jefferson wrote in 1790, “[a] treaty made by the President, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, is a law of the land, and a law
of superior order, because it not only repeals past laws, but cannot
itself be repealed by future ones.”50 However, no global police force
will ensure compliance with international law, which leaves the force
of “interest and honor,”51 or the prospect of military force, against the
state in breach. As the United States became less fearful of a military
response to its noncompliance with treaties,52 the Charming Betsy
decision53 and the last-in-time canon allow the United States more

47

See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–35 (1920) (holding that even
though Congress did not have the power to regulate the protection of migratory birds,
the same affect was legitimately achieved through treaty).
48
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
49
The obligatory reference is to Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796),
which laid to rest the belief that the peace treaty affirming debts with Great Britain
was unenforceable because it was made by the Continental Congress, and, more to the
point, established that the treaty overrode contrary subsequent state law.
50
JOHN N. MOORE, TREATY INTERPRETATION, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE
OF LAW 57 n.153 (2001) (citing THE JEFFERSONIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 880 (John P. Foley
ed., Fundk & Wagnalls Company, 1900)).
51
Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and its Treaties: Observance and Breach,
95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 313, 316 (2001) [hereinafter Vagts, Observance and Breach].
52
Id. at 327–28. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo.
L.J. 479, 492–93 (1998).
53
The case that gave its name to the doctrine, Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804), is sufficiently unremarkable in itself that a
footnote is enough, as the doctrine was then, and continues still as a common law
principle. An American ship was sold in the Caribbean islands and then captured by
French privateers. Because of the hostilities between France and the United States, an
American privateer subsequently captured the vessel believing it to be in violation of a
law that prohibited “commercial intercourse between the United States and France,
and the dependencies thereof.” The American claimed the right of salvage under U.S.
law but Justice Marshall deferred to the international law customs in awarding the
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flexibility in disavowing the “law of nations,” or at least in avoiding
their effect in domestic courts. By 1888, the Supremacy Clause meant
only that “a treaty [was] placed on the same footing, and made of like
obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by [the
Constitution] to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior
efficacy is given to either over the other.”54 In 1889, the low water
mark for the judicial enforcement of treaty observance followed with
the Chinese Exclusion Case, where the Court held that the treaty was
“the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the
pleasure of Congress.”55 Whereas Jefferson would have believed that
complying with an international agreement was a matter of the
“honor” of the President and the nation, and renegotiation would be
required to change its effect, a hundred years later it was established
that the later conflicting act superseded. Thus, in the Chinese
Exclusion Case, a federal law excluding Chinese workers prevailed
over the pre-existing treaty. But a subsequent 1894 treaty allowing
workers to return in limited circumstances prevailed over the 1888
statute.56
While it is clear that Congress can breach a treaty at its “pleasure,”
the authority of treaties has not entirely decreased to that of legislative
acts as Justice Field held in the Chinese Exclusion Case. When
Congress enacts a statute in contradiction of a pre-existing law, the
new statute typically acts as an amendment with the prior statute
taking on a modified meaning. The inescapable analogy to contract
principles illustrates why legislative treaty breach cannot be so fluid.
In the treaty context, Congress acts as only one party to the “contract.”
One party (Congress or another nation) may propose a modification to

proceeds of the sale to the prior owner. The frequently-cited language that
encapsulates the doctrine is as follows:
It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to
violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is
warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.
These principles are believed to be correct, and they ought to
be kept in view in construing the act now under consideration.
Id. at 118.
54
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
55
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
600 (U.S. 1889).
56
Vagts, supra note 51.
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the treaty, and conduct itself in according the change, but the other
party is not bound without its consent. Further, just as a breach does
not annihilate a contract, a breach will not necessarily end a treaty.57
Thus, the fact that “a provision of an international agreement is
superseded as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its
international obligation.”58 Courts still hold to the goal of giving effect
to both an international agreement and a statute.59 But in the event of a
direct contradiction between the two, even though the domestic effect
of an international obligation has been defeated by an act of Congress,
the international obligation does not evaporate as it would if a treaty
was only as binding as a legislative act. As Professor Drahozal
expressed, “when Congress enacts a law overriding a provision of a
treaty, the law may both eliminate the domestic effect of the treaty and
violate international obligations under the treaty at the same time.”60
This last-in-time construction has allowed Congress to deeply
embarrass presidents and ambassadors.61 One of these cases, Diggs v.
Shultz,62 raised the question of whether some international obligations
were too important for Congress to override. Before Shultz, the Nixon
administration had taken steps to ensure the United States’ compliance
with a U.N. Security Counsel embargo against Southern Rhodesia’s
racist government. The Byrd Amendment63 of 1971 prevented the
President from enforcing the embargo on chrome ore because of cold
war tensions. The Court rejected the argument that, because of the
stature of Security Council Resolutions Congress’s circumvention of
the embargo was ineffective.64 If the contravention of the agreements

57
That is to say that treaty obligations are independent covenants—treaties differ
from U.C.C. contract law in having no requirement for mutuality (among other
significant differences). However, violation of treaty obligations may be considered
material breach and entitle the other party(ies) to terminate the treaty. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/
1_1_1969.pdf [hereinafter VCLT].
58
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, supra
note 7, at § 115(1)(b).
59
See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 143 (2005); F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
60
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 163 (Jack Stark ed., 2004).
61
See Vagts, supra note 51, at 329–32.
62
470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
63
Armed Forces, Appropriation Authorization of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-156 §
503, 85 Stat. 423. This time it was Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia.
64
Diggs, 470 F.2d at 467 n.4.
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touching a Chapter VII Security Counsel resolution was not outside
Congress’ power, then breaching the antidumping agreements
underpinning the WTO is likewise subject to Congress’s “pleasure.”
The United States’ subordination of international obligations to
domestic law (or politics) is not unique. With roots in British common
law,65 this subordination remains, nevertheless, directly at odds with
the core principles of international law. The maxim, pacta sunt
servanda, requires observance of agreements. In international law, an
agreement is not to be made lightly, and other parties should expect
that it will be observed unless they should have known that the
agreement would be contrary to domestic law.66 For example, any
treaty partner should know that the President of the United States
possesses no power under the Constitution to prevent the U.S.
newspapers from criticizing that state because the First Amendment is
known to be a fundamental restriction on government power. Wellknown, fundamental aspects of a state’s legal makeup excepted, the
obligation to respect treaties transcends past and future domestic laws,
in line with Jefferson’s conception—and exactly as the United States
expects its treaty partners to behave. The Byrd Amendment brings the
two universes of law into alignment: domestic U.S. law and
international law. But pacta sunt servanda means that outside that
shadow, international treaty obligations continue undiminished.
In light of the historic status of international agreements, it is not
surprising that U.S. courts have interposed a buffer between the
rapidly shifting force of domestic legislation and the treaties. If the
constitutionality of the CDSO requires courts to ignore the legal force
of the GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement, domestic exporters harmed
by it cannot rely on those international legal obligations in challenging
it. In the WTO Appellate Body’s analysis, the CDSO clearly violated
the GATT; but under Charming Betsy, the analysis followed different
standards. As expressed by the Restatement, the last-in-time rule
applies “if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or
provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot
be fairly reconciled.”67 This means that a court will try to give effect to

65

Bradley, supra note 52, at 487–88.
VCLT, supra note 57, arts. 27, 46 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”).
67
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, supra
note 7, § 115(1)(a). Since the Restatement’s publication, courts have treated the “or”
as “and;” both intent and irreconcilability seem required now.
66
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both treaty and statute if possible, and looks for clear assurances from
Congress that a contradiction is not inadvertent.
In the case of the 1971 Byrd Amendment, the D.C. Circuit found it
abundantly clear from the legislative record that “no member of
Congress voting on the measure was under any doubt about what was
involved…it was as presented to the Congress...a measure that would
make—and was intended to make—the United States a certain treaty
violator.”68
Of course, Congress is not always so unmistakably clear, and
courts will traditionally strain to avoid finding “clear purpose” where
possible.69 Perhaps the high water mark of the use of the last-in-time
rule occurred in United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization,70
where Congress attempted to force the closure of the PLO’s observer
mission to the United Nations. Under the Headquarter Agreement
between the United States and the United Nations,71 the United States
agreed not only to host the United Nations, but also to accommodate
delegates. In 1974, over the U.S. objections, the United Nations
extended observer status to the PLO.72 However, in 1988, Congress
declared the PLO a threat to U.S. security and legislated the closure of
all its offices.73 While the court acknowledged that the Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1988 had the “explicit purpose” of closing the PLO offices in
the United States,74 it took advantage of the complete lack of
substantive debate regarding the act and construed that it could give
effect to both the treaty and the act. The court gave great weight to the
longstanding of the Headquarters Agreement and its centrality to the
U.N. system. While recognizing that Congress had the power to breach
such a treaty, it insisted on preserving the obligation unless the “power
[to breach was] clearly and unequivocally exercised.”75 The court gave
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Diggs, 470 F.2d at 466.
See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
70
United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (D.N.Y. 1988).
71
Agreement Between the United States and the United Nations Regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, Pub. L. No. 80-357, 61 Stat. 756 (1947),
available at http://www.un.int/usa/host_hqs.htm; see also 22 USCS § 287 (2000).
72
PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1459.
73
Whatever its effect, the law is still in force. 22 USCS § 5202 (2000).
74
PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1460.
75
Id, at 1465. While the “strong” clear statement rule seems justified by some
language in the Charming Betsy line, such as in United States v. Cook, 288 U.S. 102,
120 (1933), the length the court went to in the PLO decision was labeled by one
commentator as following the minority doctrine on intent. James Englert, Congress,
69
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effect to both the treaty and the statute by holding that the AntiTerrorism Act applied to any PLO offices in the United States not
functioning under the Headquarter Agreement (for which, of course,
there were none). Thus, despite the intended effect of the statute, this
court held that U.S. law requires overt manifestation that Congress
intends to override international obligations. Charming Betsy is
referred to as the last-in-time rule, but a later act of Congress (such as
the Anti-Terrorism Act) only displaces the domestic effect of
international agreements when they unavoidably and intentionally
conflict.
Just like the 1988 Anti-Terrorism Act, the CDSO avoided
committee hearings. When courts look for a clear congressional
statement, they will at least find that it is unclear to what degree
Congress understood the contradiction between the bills and U.S.
treaty obligations.76 This lack of clarity allows—or requires—courts to
construe the law to preserve the domestic effect of WTO obligations at
the expense of the Byrd Amendment. The fact that the administration
argued so thoroughly that the CDSO was in harmony with the
Uruguay Round does not affect the analysis of congressional
manifestation. Likewise, while the administration’s subsequent
statements of the United States’ intention to comply with the WTO
ruling77 indicate that the United States recognizes that it violated its
treaty obligations, the acknowledgement does not enter into the
Charming Betsy analysis.
Inasmuch as PLO remains the current last-in-time doctrine,78
under this “hallowed principle of American foreign relations law,”79
the CDSO would not contradict the GATT. The Appellate Body’s
decision clearly held that the existence of the CDSO was a violation of

the PLO, the World Order and the Constitution: What’s a Court to Do?, 57 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1393, 1403–05 (1989).
76
PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1470–71. See also Englert, supra note 75, at 1404.
77
See Addenda to Status Report by the United States, supra note 42.
78
As distinguished in Section B.2, infra, there are contexts in which the
Supreme Court has instead followed the line of cases descending from Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). See also Michael Franck, Note, The Future of
Judicial Internationalism: Charming Betsy, Medellin v. Dretke, and the Consular
Rights Disputes, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 515 (2006). However, such decisions as Allegheny
Lublum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004), Roeder v. Iran,
333 F.3d 228, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, 203
F.3d 116, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2000) highlight the ongoing vitality of PLO’s reluctance to
needlessly construe the abrogation of a treaty.
79
Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT’L. L. 458,
459 (1998).
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the U.S. commitments in the international realm. However, in the
United States the absence of clear intent to violate the GATT means
that the later-in-time action does not mechanically prevail. Just as in
PLO, the senators could expect that the statute would have effect only
to the extent the treaty did not govern.
This means that the exclusionary provision in the Uruguay Round
enacting language in 19 U.S.C. § 2504 (2000) would therefore not be
implicated. It provides that “[n]o provision of any trade
agreement...which is in conflict with any statute of the United States
shall be given effect under the laws of the United States.” Without
clear statement of intent from Congress, there could be no “conflict”
under § 2405.80 Although the DSB Appellate Body eschewed
legislative intent analysis,81 preferring the plain language approach,
had legislative debate made it clear that the CDSO would conflict with
WTO obligations, a clear violation would have arisen under both U.S.
law and WTO policy. Because Congress attached the CDSO as a rider
to the conference committee version of a must-pass agricultural
appropriations bill, there was simply no opportunity to demonstrate the
clear intent required under PLO.
Can the legislature unilaterally violate a treaty? Yes. Congress has
the power. U.S. law recognizes that although the treaty obligation still
exists, Congress can nevertheless defeat the domestic effect of the
obligation. Did Congress violate the treaty by applying the CDSO to
antidumping duties from WTO members? Certainly, but the obligation
continues under U.S. law. Absent explicit legislative intent, the CDSO
does not extinguish WTO agreements, at home or abroad. So even
under the last-in-time rule, the CDSO exists parallel to the
unabrogated WTO agreements and both have effect in the U.S. courts.

80
The Supreme Court recently declined to conduct a conflict analysis to reach
the opposite result in Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União Do Vegetal,
126 S. Ct 1211, 1224–25 (2006). The government’s assertion that U.S. drug
enforcement treaties were important did not prevail over the U.S. statute’s built-in
“compelling interest” standard.
81
The Appellate Body chided the DSB panel with its quotation from the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties: “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Appellate Body Report, supra note
20, ¶ 281.
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B. Possible Causes of Action
Non-states have no standing in international courts. The Statute of
the International Court of Justice clearly provides that “only states
may be parties in cases before the Court.”82 Likewise, in the WTO
system, “only those Members that are parties…may participate in
decisions or actions taken by the DSB,”83 and only states may be
“Members.” Although the law of state responsibility has long
protected individual aliens, and individuals are capable of breaching
their nation’s obligations to another state, traditionally, no mechanism
allows an individual to invoke international law—the state must
espouse the claim or answer for the violation. Thus, although the
United Nations can respond to complaints against states from nongovernmental organizations (on human rights issues), no international
forum exists for an NGO—let alone an individual corporation—to
seek redress under commercial international law.84
Additionally, nations consent to claims by individual corporations
through bilateral investment treaties. However, these treaties do not
provide a forum for U.S. companies to sue the U.S. Government.
Rather, corporations from one nation may only sue the other nation
causing the harm. The EU, which is not a nation, has acted pursuant to
the valid findings of an international legal body, so there is no cause of
action against it. The U.S. companies have no international forum for
their complaint, and ability to enforce any potential awards. Their only
hope is U.S. law, whereby the CDSO is clearly a valid exercise of
Congress’s commerce power.85
The U.S. manufacturer subject to fifteen percent duties is crushed
between the action of a domestically legal, albeit internationally illegal
statute, and the undisputedly valid actions of the WTO. As the United
States Treasury distributes legitimately collected antidumping duties to
the industries affected by the dumping, the machine manufacturer is
paying for the illegal “trade effect” through foreign taxes.

82

Stat. of the Int’l Ct. of J., June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, art. 3.
DSU art. 2.1.
84
Duties do not fall under human rights law, the other branch of international
law that concerns individual’s rights. It is in this area that the first steps towards
creating a private cause of action against states are being made. Even though the
European Court of Human Rights has the ability to hear the claims of individuals
against states and has power to enforce its findings, the difficulty of satisfying
admissibility (which is standing plus stating a cause of action) means that few claims
ever succeed.
85
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
83

194

SPRING 2007

BYRD AMENDMENT

Section A demonstrated that the CDSO would only extinguish the
domestic effect of international obligations if it were directly and
deliberately in conflict with Congressional action. Since it does not
supersede international law under the PLO standard, the CDSO must
be reconciled with the broader international obligations. Just as the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1988 was confined to apply only to PLO
missions other than the U.N.’s (where there were none), the CDSO
would be logically confined to dispersing antidumping duties where it
does not violate the AD and SCM Agreements,86 i.e., when they are
collected from non-WTO Members. This theory is bolstered by the
recent decision in the Court of International Trade reading such a
limitation as to NAFTA Members.
1. Candian Lumber v. United States
Even though the WTO tribunals found that the incentives created
by the CDSO did not per se violate AD and SCM agreements,
domestic producers (and the trade law firms that represented them)
certainly had a motive to bring dumping complaints against their
foreign competitors. By 2002, the Department of Commerce found
several Canadian industries were dumping on the U.S. market. Seeing
millions of dollars paid to their U.S. competitors, the Canadian
businesses brought Canadian Lumber Trade Association v. United
States to block the application of the Byrd Amendment to Canadian
goods based on the NAFTA implementation act and the
Administrative Procedures Act.87

86
The DSB Appellate Body report called the Byrd Amendment an illegal
incentive for companies to initiate antidumping complaints (see supra II.C.4). The
elimination of this finding in the Appellate Body report makes reconciling WTO
obligations and the CDSO much simpler. While the DSB Panel stated, “We find it
difficult to conceive of any method which would be more appropriate and/or effective
than the repeal of the CDSOA measure,” (Panel Report, supra note 10, at 8.6) the
Appellate report merely “request[ed] the United States bring the CDSOA into
conformity with its obligations” (Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, at 319). The
restriction required by the Charming Betsy canon achieves this effect, preventing
unauthorized specific action against dumping or subsidization.
87
25 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006). The time for appeal has not yet
passed because a final judgment on remedy has not yet issued. Id. at 133–34. Because
several billion dollars are still being held in special CDSO accounts, the repeal of the
Byrd amendment will not likely discourage an appeal. There is a chance, however,
that negotiations between the United States and Canada on the larger issue of the
Department of Commerce’s dumping finding, will settle the issue without the help of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Ontario Forest Prod. Ass’n v. United
States, 2006 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 123 at *28.

195

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 3

Canada was a complaining party in the dispute before the WTO
where they were the voice for Canadian companies who could not sue
under the GATT AD Agreement themselves. NAFTA, on the other
hand, requires member countries to grant foreign importers access to
courts to directly contest adverse determinations. Therefore, although
Canada joined the complaint, its status and interest were not identical
to the Canadian producers.
On the merits, the Court of International Trade found in favor of
the Canadian producers, not by invalidating the CDSO in toto, but by
finding that it did not apply to the companies from NAFTA countries.
This judicially mandated redaction operated the same as Charming
Betsy acted in the PLO case in tailoring the CDSO’s effect.
Nevertheless, this was not a Charming Betsy decision, for that
common law principle had been negotiated into NAFTA at
§ 1902(2)(a), which stated that an “amendment [to a NAFTA party’s
antidumping law or countervailing duty law] shall apply to goods from
another Party only if the amending statute specifies that it applies to
goods from that Party or from the Parties to this Agreement.”
Accordingly, the doctrine was enacted in the United States as Section
408 of the NAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3438. It provides,
“Any amendment enacted after [NAFTA] enters into force . . . to . . .
the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.), or any successor
statute . . . shall apply to goods from a NAFTA country only to the
extent specified in the amendment.”
Due to the incorporation of these principles into the implementing
language, the Canadian Lumber decision was a simpler expresslanguage analysis than most Charming Betsy decisions. Instead of
express-language serving simply as a guide88 to legislative intent, the
court held that § 408 required “magic words”89 expressly including
NAFTA parties in the CDSO. As such language was patently absent
from the CDSO, the court concluded:
In sum, essentially, the Byrd Amendment converts
what was just a tariff into a broader compensatory
regime. Certainly, this change in the nature of the
remedies available under the trade laws is something
Section 408 is meant to foreclose as to Canadian and
Mexican goods where Congress has not explicitly

88

Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir.

2004).
89

196

Canadian Lumber, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 1333–34.

SPRING 2007

BYRD AMENDMENT

stated an intent to change the statutory remedies as to
Canada and Mexico.90
Section 408 made the merits of Canadian Lumber quite clear, but even
without it, the last-in-time rule should have led to the same result. That
this provision was specially implemented (where, for example, the
other elements of § 1902(2) are not) indicated that negotiators were
not willing to rely on the common law to protect their rights.91 At the
very least, Canadian Lumber provided a model remedy for foreign
importers as well as domestic exporters harmed by retaliation, a model
that many would like to see extended to WTO Members.
2. Extending the exclusion to all WTO members
Section 408 of the NAFTA Implementation Act—and its intent to
prevent inadvertent impairment of the NAFTA partnership—applies to
amendments, like the Byrd Amendment that changed antidumping
and/or countervailing duty law after NAFTA’s enactment. In general,
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1904, represents the
contrary presumption that “[n]o provision of any trade agreement
approved by Congress under [the act] nor the application of any such
provision to any person or circumstance, which is in conflict with any
statute of the United States shall be given effect under the laws of the
United States.”92 As this runs counter to the international law doctrine
of pacta sunt servanda and the standard of observance the United
States expects of its trading partners, this language appears out of
place (and somewhat arrogant). However, because the Charming Betsy
standard for conflict requires direct, even express, conflict before
§ 2504 should apply; most trade agreements are not affected.
In addition to the baseline standard of § 2504, both the NAFTA
and Uruguay Round implementation statutes contain their own
subordination clauses, § 3312(a) and § 3512(a), respectively. “No
provision of the Agreement, nor the application of any such provision
to any person or circumstance, which is inconsistent with any law of

90

Id. at 1370.
It is also possible that the doctrine was not common among the NAFTA
parties so the United States’ inclusion of a statutory provision was merely a reiteration
setting a good example.
92
19 U.S.C. § 2504 (2000) (emphasis added).
91
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the United States shall have effect.”93 Even the substitution of the
broader standard of “inconsistency” instead of “conflict” does not
break the Charming Betsy analysis. Whereas the last-in-time rule (and
§ 2504) would presume inconsistencies were inadvertent oversights,
perhaps the use of “inconsistent” suggests Congress’s expectation of
greater flexibility to adjust the United States’ trade practice based on
internal concerns and to be free from external restraints.94 However, in
the Court of International Trade’s opinion in Canadian Lumber, any
distinction was lost and the court explained how to “reconcile”
inconsistency: “[l]imit the reach of the Byrd Amendment to nonNAFTA goods.”95
Canadian Lumber was an Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
action to enjoin agency action inconsistent with statute. An APA claim
brought by domestic importers would not fail on § 2504(a) or
§ 3512(a) if the court applied the Charming Betsy rule of
interpretation. Nevertheless, the fact that the clash of a treaty and
statute arose pursuant to a decision by an international tribunal added
another layer to the analysis. Under international law, decisions from a
tribunal designated to interpret treaty obligations are authoritative
statements as to the meaning of treaty obligations,96 just as national
courts authoritatively interpret national statutes and constitutions.97
Whereas bodies like the International Court of Justice are in the
difficult position of dictating the conduct of sovereign states in highly

93
19 U.S.C. § 3312(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). The GATT version has one
grammatical change: “No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance that is inconsistent
with any law of the United States shall have effect.” 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2000).
94
Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(noting that trade laws are not exempt from the Charming Betsy principle).
95
425 F. Supp. 2d at 1370. The significance here is the willingness to resolve
inconsistency instead of treating § 3312(a) as cutting off the court’s efforts to
harmonize statute and treaty. In Canadian Lumber, the potential inconsistency was
between § 408 (a rule of construction) and the Byrd Amendment (a substantive act,
silent on construction). In the case of the Uruguay Agreement’s AD and CSM
provisions with the Byrd Amendment, both are substantive. Nevertheless, the
reasoning still holds because, arguably, the § 408 vs. Byrd clash is in how to give
effect to the intentions of Congress. In both cases the court’s task is to determine
whether there is sufficient indication that Congress expected their bill to contravene
U.S. treaty obligations.
96
See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 7, art.
36(2)(a); U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
97
It is also true—and this is the distinction with common law systems—that
even ICJ opinions lack precedential force as to situations and states not party to a
decision.

198

SPRING 2007

BYRD AMENDMENT

political situations,98 the WTO dispute resolution panels and appellate
bodies simply allow self-help suspension of concessions. Decisions are
more practical to implement because the prevailing party always holds
the reins.99
Whatever status they have in international law, international
tribunals weigh less in the U.S. jurisprudence than would logically
follow from their authoritative role in defining treaty obligations. The
United States is not alone100 in allowing a disconnection between the
effect of decisions on the international plane and the domestic force of
those same decisions, but it has a reputation of dealing with this
disconnection in a manner that is “confused, unsystematic, and ad
hoc.”101 This is not because there is no black-letter standard, Breard v.
Greene states that the U.S. courts “should give respectful
consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered
by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such.”102 In
Timken Company v. United States,103 when a foreign importer
challenged the Department of Commerce’s dumping calculations after
the WTO found a particular methodology contrary to the AD/SCM
Agreements, the “respectful consideration” granted was very weak
indeed. Yet, whereas Timken’s zeroing challenge came up against both
statute and reasonable agency interpretation, a challenge to the CDSO
after the WTO’s decision would not trigger the resistance that Timken
met.
In Timken, the courts did not defer to WTO Appellate Body
interpretation of the treaty, but instead on a distinguishable factor in
the situation contemplated for domestic exporters under the CDSO.
Prior to the WTO affirmatively finding that the United State’s practice
of “zeroing”104 was inconsistent with the GATT in Timken, the Court

98
See Christina Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribunals, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONALS LAW 1108, 1113 (R. Bernhardt ed, 1995).
99
See DSU arts. 3(2), 19, 22.
100
See generally Martin A. Rogoff, Application of Treaties and the Decisions of
International Tribunals in the United States and France: Reflections on Recent
Practice, 58 ME. L. REV. 405 (2006).
101
Id. at 413.
102
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (overriding the ICJ’s
interpretation of the Vienna Convention due to established U.S. due process
provisions).
103
345 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
104
“Zeroing” is shorthand for the practice of basing dumping findings on
weighted-average dumping margins. The Department of Commerce treats as zero
those transactions where a company’s (or industry’s) dumping margin was less than
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of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the practice as a reasonable
interpretation of statute.105 The Japanese importer had asserted a
Charming Betsy claim on the plain language of the GATT combined
with the WTO decision finding the EC’s zeroing practice inconsistent
with its AD/SMC Agreements.106 As the decision was between the EC
and India, the court found it significant that the WTO was not
analyzing the U.S.’s practice. Thus, the WTO’s analysis was not
“sufficiently persuasive to find Commerce’s practice unreasonable.”107
Timken seems to have inoculated the Department of Commerce
from further challenges even after the WTO decisions in United
States.108 The Federal Circuit in Corus Staal109 chose to read Timken as
a repudiation of WTO’s jurisdiction. Selectively quoting Timken,
Corus Staal asserted definitively, “WTO decisions are not binding on
the United States, much less this court.”110 While the Court was of
course correct in saying that “[n]either the GATT nor any enabling
international agreement outlining compliance therewith (e.g., the
[ADA Agreement]) trump[ed] domestic legislation,” it ignored the
last-in-time principles in relying on § 3512(a). So much so that the
correct reason for dismissing the importer’s arguments (for reasons
discussed shortly), namely 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g), was merely an
afterthought in a string cite.111
In hitchhiking on its Timken decision, the Federal Circuit truncated
its analysis and failed to ground itself in the “respectful consideration”
standard.112 The Supreme Court recently explained the rationale and
meaning of that standard in terms of jurisdiction in Sanchez-Llamas v.

zero and makes its findings based only on the dumped goods. When applied, this
technique inexorably results in a greater aggregate than if dumped transactions are
offset by those transactions where there was no dumping.
105
Id. at 1342.
106
Id. at 1333–34. See Appellate Body Report, E.C.—Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001).. . .
107
354 F.3d at 1344.
108
Sunset Review of Anti-dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel
Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2003); Final Dumping
Determination On Softwood Lumber From Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11,
2004).
109
Corus Staal BV v. Department of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(frequently called Corus Staal II).
110
Id. at 1348 (internal citations omitted).
111
See also Timken, 354 F.3d at 1345 (stopping its analysis before explaining §
3533 because it had already decided on Chevron principles § 3512(a)).
112
See Breard, 523 U.S. at 371.
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Oregon decision.113 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion recited,
“‘The judicial Power of the United States’ is ‘vested in one supreme
Court . . . and . . . inferior courts,’ and that ‘power . . . extends to . . .
treaties.’”114 Chief Justice Roberts further stated, “If treaties are to be
given effect as federal law, determining their meaning as a matter of
federal law is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department.”115 Given that the “one supreme court” endorsed
Charming Betsy, Robert’s statement does not intend to displace
international tribunals. Instead, Roberts’s statement simply means that
until the Court repudiates the last-in-time principles, federal courts
should give meaning to the law of nations unless directly contradicted
by Congressional action.116 It is not a dereliction of the Constitutional
duty to be influenced by courts that—by U.S. agreement—interpret the
U.S. treaties. It is giving effect to a long standing federal doctrine that
Congress has shown that it knows how to reconcile its legal
obligations and override these obligations for domestic purposes.117
Rejecting international tribunals is not asserting the jurisdiction of the
U.S. courts, but simply abandoning a domestic canon in the name of
jingoism.
While it is understandable that “nationalist legal theorists are wary
of ceding decision-making power to officials who are not accountable
to the American electorate in the way envisaged by their vision of the
Constitution,”118 Charming Betsy already deals with conflicting
sovereignty by allowing Congress to override (when it is clear) the
domestic effect of a treaty that is incompatible with U.S. law. Disdain
for the encroachment of international tribunals is misplaced given this
established, built-in safeguard, especially when the United States is

113

126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). Even though much of Sanchez-Llamas deals with the
effect of a treaty on Oregon’s state practice, the analysis of the role of international
tribunals is no different from and is more recent than the discussion in Breard and
others.
114
Id. at 2864 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III §§ 1–2).
115
Id. (internal citations omitted).
116
There is no danger of, in the words of the Federal Circuit, an international
decision being treated as “proxy for independent analysis.” Cummins Inc. v. United
States, 454 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
117
Also see other cases in the long tradition of clear statement rules. E.g.,
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005); Lockhart v. United
States, 546 U.S. 142 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302,
210 (1955); Great N. R. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908).
118
Rogoff, supra note 100, at 431.
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already the dominant player at the negotiating table for any
international treaty.119
Despite the Federal Circuit’s eagerness to disregard foreign
tribunals and Robert’s posturing in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, other
elements of that opinion support honoring Charming Betsy and
invalidating the Byrd Amendment. In deciding that “respectful
consideration” of the tribunal (the ICJ) in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon
allowed rejecting its decision, the Court was influenced by the nature
of the remedies contemplated and the position taken by the executive
on the agreement.120 The Court observed that the ICJ’s enforcement
power came through the United Nations Security Council and thus
“contemplate[d] quintessentially international remedies.”121 Security
Council enforcement, as it is tied up with geopolitical power brokering
and collective state action, represents an extreme of the international
relations spectrum. At another extreme are the transaction-bytransaction assessments of countervailing duties by the states that
prevail in WTO disputes. Some WTO obligations are enforced abroad,
and others play out, as NAFTA actions do, in domestic courts and
before domestic administrative agencies. All this suggests that the
obligations undertaken under the GATT contemplate the treatment of
individual companies in the national system even though the
obligation at issue in Sanchez-Llamas, the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, contemplated a specific optional enforcement
mechanism far removed from the police officers or even municipalities
who implement Article 36(1)(c).122 Congress’s simple ratification of

119

See generally John E. Noyes, American Hegemony, U.S. Political Leaders,
and General International Law, 19 Conn. J. Int’l L. 293, 296 (2004); Jurgen Kurtz, A
General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 of NAFTA and
the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 713, 716
(2002) (putting the U.S. among dominant forces in global investment).
120
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685.
121
Id. (emphasis in original).
122
That section provides as follows:
(1) With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State:
***
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of
the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to
converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
representation. They shall also have the right to visit any
national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or
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the Vienna Convention (even though it is deemed to be self-executing)
and statutory implementation of the GATT indicate the vast
differences between the two agreements. Whereas the Vienna
Convention’s posture cuts against honoring the ICJ’s interpretation,
the nature of GATT obligations weighs in favor of honoring WTO
dispute settlement process in the U.S. courts.
In addition, the distinction between the executive’s treatment of
the two treaties weighs strongly in favor of weakening the CDSO.
Whereas the Bush administration affirmatively repudiated the
enforcement protocol to the Vienna Convention specifically to avoid
ICJ interpretation, both the Clinton and Bush administrations criticized
the Byrd Amendment. Administration attorneys repeatedly asserted
their intention to comply with the WTO DSB decision and pledged to
repeal the CDSO, which they eventually accomplished. “Respectful
consideration” means much more in this instance because, “while
courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the
departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation
and enforcement is given great weight.”123
Due to this affirmation that Charming Betsy still has vitality, we
return to the internal limitations imposed by the implementation
language to an APA suit to bring the interpretation of agency conduct
in line with the United States’ international obligations.124 As alluded
to above, 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g) represents exactly the type of language
that overcomes the Charming Betsy presumption that Congress does
not violate international agreements. The multi-tiered scheme makes
clear Congress’s intent to interrupt the interpretation of the treaty by
the WTO dispute settlement system. The statute provides that the U.S.

detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking
action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or
detention if he expressly opposes such action.
Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261.
123
The Court of International Trade observed the following in one of its Corus
Staal decisions:
Had the Government appeared here saying it had lost in the WTO,
with respect to this very administrative determination, and it had
complied with the entire statutory framework, to the effect that it
was reversing its position, even as to a past determination, then
the court would have to consider what to do.
Corus Staal BV v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (2005).
124
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset, 19 C.F.R. § 159.61–64 (2005).
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“practice may not be amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified in the
implementation of” a WTO DSB report until the United States
completed its own reexamination.125 Section 3533(g)(1) sets up a
lengthy review process, making it clear that the domestic effect of a
WTO DSB decision is not automatic. The review process proceeds as
follows: first, consultations between the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), the agency, relevant congressional
committees, and the private sector; then notice and comment, followed
by publication of the modification and its explanation in the Federal
Register; and finally another round of consultation between the USTR,
agency, and relevant congressional committees regarding

125

The statute reads:
§ 3533 Dispute settlement panels and procedures
***
(g) Requirements for agency action
(1) Changes in agency regulations or practice
In any case in which a dispute settlement panel or the
Appellate Body finds in its report that a regulation or
practice of a department or agency of the United States is
inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
that regulation or unless and until—
(A) the appropriate congressional committees have been
consulted under subsection (f) of this section;
(B) the Trade Representative has sought advice regarding
the modification from relevant private sector advisory
committees established under section 2155 of this title;
(C) the head of the relevant department or agency has
provided an opportunity for public comment by publishing
in the Federal Register the proposed modification and the
explanation for the modification;
(D) the Trade Representative has submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees a report describing
the proposed modification, the reasons for the
modification, and a summary of the advice obtained under
subparagraph (B) with respect to the modification;
(E) the Trade Representative and the head of the relevant
department or agency have consulted with the appropriate
congressional committees on the proposed contents of the
final rule or other modification; and
(F) the final rule or other modification has been published
in the Federal Register.

19 U.S.C. § 3533 (2000).
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implementation of the new determination. By the time Corus Staal’s
challenge of zeroing came before the Court of International Trade
(CIT) again in 2005, this process had clearly started,126 which
indicated that the United States intended on complying with the GATT
as interpreted by the DSB. Nevertheless, as the full process was
incomplete, the CIT lacked the power to short-circuit it by enforcing
the GATT over the statute. The statute was enacted with an
understanding of treaty interpretation canons, and when it comes to the
WTO, Congress knows how to interrupt those canons when it wishes.
Section 3533(g) likewise applies to the Department of Commerce
and the CDSO, but whereas the calculation of dumping margins is the
role of the Department of Commerce, which is shielded by § 3533, the
International Trade Commission (ITC) plays a fundamental role in
Byrd payments but is explicitly excluded from the scheme blocking
the effect of DSB reports in § 3533(g)(4).127 Instead, § 3538 applies
specifically to the ITC’s “administrative action following WTO panel
reports” and allows for a discretionary reporting procedure triggered
by the USTR. Although it structured § 3538 as an optional route,
Congress did not provide for anything, as the restriction “may not be
amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified” that applies to all other
agencies. Thus, even though the ITC is just one link in the chain of
Byrd distributions, if the ITC does not fulfill its role, the Byrd
distributions cannot be made.128 Whereas the barrier to implementing

126
127

387 F. Supp 2d. at 1299.
The pertinent part of the § 3533’s Dispute settlement panels and procedures

reads:
(g) Requirements for agency action
***
(4) Inapplicability to ITC
This subsection does not apply to any regulation or practice of the
International Trade Commission.
19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(4) (2000).
128
The threshold questions for standing under the Administrative Procedure Act,
60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) are whether (1)
the U.S. exporter is injured in fact by the agency’s illegal action, (2) their situation is
in the “zone of interest” intended to be protected by the provision the agency has
violated, and (3) the court can provide relief. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs.. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). While it has been long established that customs
regulations fall under the APA, it is another matter for exporters to demonstrate that
theirs is a class intended to be protected. Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 43 Cust.
Ct. 627 (1959) (including antidumping decisions within the scope of even the APA’s
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DSB reports by most agencies is to “ensure that any modifications to
regulatory practice as well as statutory changes to comply with dispute
settlement findings are made with the full knowledge of the
Congress,”129 Congress exerts less oversight upon the ITC130 because
of its special role in trade policy and negotiations.
Given that the Byrd amendment “ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains,”131 courts could enjoin the ITC from continuing to cause the
United States to violate the law of nations when the other possible
construction demonstrated by Canadian Lumber remains.132
Prior APA challenges based on WTO DSB reports in Corus Staal
failed on two grounds: (1) the Federal Circuit’s affirmative finding
that Department of Commerce’s practice demonstrated a reasonable
application of the statute, was based on reasoning prior to the WTO
DSB report; and (2) the language of § 3533(g) indicated that a DSB
report could not modify agency practice. Neither of those elements
applies to the CDSO. On the strength of all the legal and policy
reasons stated above, the Byrd Amendment should be construed to not
apply to WTO members.

procedural requirements) rev’d on other grounds 296 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1960)
(leaving the Customs Court’s reasoning untouched but finding the contention could
not be raised for the first time on appeal). The Byrd Amendment is concerned about
protecting domestic markets even at the expense of the class of U.S. exporters. Far
from being a protected class, U.S. exporters are a class whose interests were strikingly
absent from the Byrd Amendment’s zone of protection. While the supremacy clause
certainly does nothing to exclude the theoretical possibility of a private cause of action
based on international law, courts are reluctant to give weight to the claims.
Specifically, just as criminal statutes do not usually create a private cause of action,
the existence of a fully binding international law may simply not have been intended
to be privately enforceable. Given the existence of the WTO’s own enforcement
mechanism, U.S. courts would not permit private companies to enforce WTO
obligations themselves.
129
H.R. REP. NO 103-826, pt. 1, at 33 (1994). 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (2000) states
that this report, the statement of administrative action, “shall be regarded as an
authoritative expression by the United States concerning the interpretation and
application of the Uruguay Round Agreements and this Act [the Uruguay Round
Agreement Act] in any judicial proceeding in which a question arises concerning such
interpretation or application.”
130
See 19 U.S.C. § 3004 (2000) (the president makes changes to the HTSUS by
proclamation—not through Congressional ratification); 19 U.S.C. § 3005 (2000) (the
ITC makes recommendations on changes to HTSUS to the President while ensuring
harmony with negotiations and the GATT); S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 26 (1994) (linking
ITC policies to USTR positions rather than Congress’).
131
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
132
See supra pp. 29–30.
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3. The Takings clause
The vitality of Charming Betsy jurisprudence is all the more
important given the difficulty the innocent domestic exporters
experience in gaining protection under constitutional arguments based
on takings or illegitimate taxation. The takings clause might be
implicated because the regulatory effect of the CDSO is to take money
from certain U.S. companies, like the hypothetical machinery
manufacturer/exporter, and give it to other U.S. companies threatened
by foreign dumping, like the bearing industry. It is arguably
unimportant that the money passes through, the EU, for example. By
virtue of the Byrd Amendment, every time bearing manufacturers
receive payouts from EU anti-dumping duties, machinery
manufacturers must pay a proportional amount. As soon as the
distributions stop, the retaliatory duties will stop as well.133 Thus,
causation is both direct and proportional: the Byrd tax goes into effect
as soon as the U.S. Treasury distributes antidumping duties charged to
a company from a WTO member.
What would be a taking if the federal government performed it
directly is no less a taking because it is carried out—pursuant to
legislative authority—by another entity. The problem is not who is
empowered to conduct the taking, but whether it meets the Fifth
Amendment’s conditions. The taking must be for “public use” and
“just compensation” and it must be paid to the property owner for the
loss.134 In the case of the CDSO, a successful claim on either condition
would suffice, for if the CDSO were to fail on “public use” ground, the
taking would be enjoined,135 and were it to pass as a “public use,” then
the taking would be compensable. Compensation would be equivalent
to the readily ascertainable duty, and the effect of the taking would be
eliminated.

133

“In this case, the level of suspension of concessions will automatically
depend on the amount of disbursements made under the CDSOA in a given year. If
this amount decreases, so will the level of suspension of concessions or other
obligations that the Requesting Parties will be entitled to impose. If no disbursements
are made, the level of suspension will have to be ‘zero.’” Recourse to Arbitration by
the United States, United States–Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
¶ 4.24, WT/DS217/ARB/EEC (August 31, 2004); DSU art. 22.8.
134
E.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231–32 (2003).
135
E.g., Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1991) (reinforcing that
a taking for purely private use is unconstitutional no matter the amount of just
compensation given).
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CDSO Payments to the Top Five Companies and to the
Remaining Companies in Fiscal Years 2001-2004136

In September 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GOA)
analyzed the effect of the CDSO in light of the retaliatory duties. One
of the report’s major criticisms137 stated that although 770 companies
received some portion of the one billion dollars of the Byrd
Amendment distributions at the date of the report, the “payments ha[d]
been highly concentrated in a few companies.”138 The fact that the
distributions remained so concentrated among so few companies and
industries calls into question whether the Byrd Amendment is for
“public use.” The GOA’s graph illustrates the geometric decline in the
portion of distributions.139 While innocent manufacturers have not

136

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ISSUES AND
EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT 29,
GAO-05-979 (2005).
137
Another criticism was the administrative monster that the Department created
to process accusations of dumping and then evaluate statements of “qualifying
expenditure.” If the Canadian Softwood Lumber dispute pending at the CIT is
sustained, the (illegal) distribution of billions of dollars of treasury money will be an
unprecedented burden—first on the treasury, and then on innocent companies
exporting to Canada who will have to make up that amount in retaliatory payments.
138
ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND
SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT, supra note 136, at 28.
139
Timken (who received 20% of distributions on the graph) acquired the
Torrington Company (13%) in 2003, Timken-About Us, http://www.timken.com/
aboutus/history/, and is the parent company MPB (5%) for a combined total of 38%.

208

SPRING 2007

BYRD AMENDMENT

sued to stop enforcement of the Byrd Amendment, many eligible
distribution recipients have sued for a greater share of the largesse.140
Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” requirement is not
based on any formula, and, in this case, does not require a whole
industry to benefit.141 The focus is the scope of applicability, not the
actual short term benefit. A taking does not “fail to be public upon the
ground that the immediate enjoyment of it is limited to a small group
or even to a single person.”142 Given that “public use” is broadly
construed in deference to legislators, and as nothing indicates that
benefit aims a “particular class of identifiable individuals,” the Byrd
Amendment is unlikely to conflict with the “public use” requirement,
however skewed the payouts are.143
Without the possibility of enjoining the taking for lack of public
purpose, the companies subject to retaliatory duties must seek
compensation for the appropriation of their property. The Byrd
Amendment is a “shifting of an economic opportunity from the owner
to third parties,” which is the essence of a taking.144 In the case of
machinery exports to the EU, the shifting is at the rate of fifteen
percent, but some dairy products exported to Mexico, for example, are
subject to a thirty percent duty;145 at that rate, exportation costs
become such a burden that the interference eclipses the benefits of sale
and harms the industry.146

ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET
ACT, supra note 136, at 29 n.39.
140
See, e.g., Cathedral Candle Co. v. United States, 400 F.3d 1352 (2005).
141
Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (“it is not
essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, should directly
enjoy or participate in any improvement in order to constitute a public use”).
142
United States v. Boyle, 52 F. Supp. 906 (D. Ohio 1943).
143
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984); Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
144
William P. Barr et al., The Gild that is Killing the Lily: How Confusion over
Regulatory Takings Doctrine is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings
Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 438 (2005).
145
Decreto por el que se modifica temporalmente el artículo 1 del Decreto por el
que se establece la Tasa Aplicable durante 2003, del Impuesto General de
Importación, par las mercancías originarias de América del Norte, publicado el 31 de
diciembre do 2002, por lo que respecta a las mercancías originarias de EE.UU.
[Decree Temporarily Modifying Import Duties for Goods Originating in the U.S.A.],
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], art. 1, 17 de agosto de 2005 (Mex.) available
at http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/dof/2005/agosto/dof_17-08-2005.pdf.
146
Press Release, Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition, Mexico to
Impose $21 Million in Retaliatory Tariffs Against U.S. Exports; CITAC Says Byrd
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The problem with a Fifth Amendment challenge is that because
the subject of the taking is merchandise in commerce, the putative
taking is manifested in transaction costs on one end and subsidies on
the other. Even though the effect is clearly “a law that takes property
from A and gives it to B,”147 the transfer is accomplished by taking a
fractional value of property in a way that looks like a tax. While the
takings clause would render useless a law requiring a (machinery)
company to write a check to another (bearing) company, Congress
could accomplish the same thing if it broke the transfer into two steps
with the taxing power. The taxing power trumps the takings clause
when the two seem to overlap because the taxing power would be
meaningless if the collection of taxes was a compensable taking, or
essentially, “the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring
upon the one hand a taxing power and taking the same power
away.”148
4. The power to tax is subject to very weak standards
Congress clearly possesses the power to either incentivize or
discourage behavior through taxation. For example, if it desires to
discourage tobacco consumption, it can increase the applicable tax
rate. Congress could choose to make smoking prohibitively expensive
without exceeding its discretion. The maxim from McCullough is “the
power to tax involves the power to destroy.”149 Likewise, if it chooses
to grant special incentives to any industry, Congress has great latitude
within its power to act for the “general welfare.” However, the
arbitrary way U.S. exporters are subjected to “Byrd tax” combined
with the tiny portion of companies that receive distributions might
mean that it does not advance the general welfare. Nevertheless, the
legal standard is very low; only the clearest corruption would exceed
the taxing and spending power:
[the dominance of the taxing power over the Fifth
Amendment] would have no application in a case
where[,] although there was a seeming exercise of the
taxing power, the act complained of was so arbitrary as

Amendment Must Be Repealed (Aug. 18, 2005), http://www.citac.info/press/release/
2005/08_18.php.
147
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 386, 388 (1798).
148
Brushaber v. Union P.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916).
149
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 431 (1819).
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to constrain to the conclusion that it was not the
exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property, that
is, a taking of the same in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, or, what is equivalent thereto, was so
wanting in basis for classification as to produce such a
gross and patent inequality as to inevitably lead to the
same conclusion.150
While the companies paying retaliatory duties may feel subjected to
“gross and patent inequality,” the Byrd Amendment only has to meet a
rational standard. As explained in part III.B.1., it even meets the
higher requirements of “public use.”
Arguably, allowing other governments’ legislators to choose
which U.S. industries pay for the Byrd Amendment subsidies is the
apogee of caprice. However, what looks like a capricious and arbitrary
exertion of the taxing power is clearly acceptable in light of the
Charming Betsy canon of treaty reconciliation because, under the PLO
standard, a court would look for unequivocal intent to repudiate a
treaty, and it would give effect to both the U.S. treaty obligation and
the Byrd Amendment. Regarding the treaty obligation, the only
mechanism an exporter subject to retaliatory duties posesses to
challenge the Byrd distributions is to follow the Canadian Lumber
model and seek an injunction against the distributions from WTO
members under the APA. To the degree that penalties involve the
WTO and foreign governments, a court must give effect to the United
States’ acceptance of WTO mechanisms and leave its treaty obligation
intact. If courts ignore the policies of Charming Betsy, innocent
exporters can never prevail against what is facially a clear exercise of
commerce power, and what is in substance an unassailable exercise of
the taxing power.
IV. CONCLUSION
Innocent exporters are trapped between international law and U.S.
law.151 Thus, if courts overextend Sanchez-Llamas and other decisions
in that vein by turning their backs on Charming Betsey, the only forum

150

Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24–25.
“[T]he conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the
political departments of the Federal Government; . . . the propriety of the exercise of
that power is not open to judicial inquiry.” United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222–
23 (1942). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
151
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for innocent exporters penalized by the CDSO subsidies will be
Congress. As the CDSO distributions increase, and whatever the
Appellate report found about incentives152 all predictions say they
must,153 so will the retaliatory payments charged to innocent exporters.
Whether or not exporters could get relief from courts, the WTO hopes
that they will convince U.S. legislators to stop letting other
governments take from A so that Congress can give to B. As the effect
of the determination by the WTO Appellate body that the CDSO
violated international agreements is not controlled by the doctrines in
Sanchez-Llamas, innocent exporters should be able to rely on a
resuscitation of the traditional last-in-time rules to invalidate the effect
of the CDSO. The insertion of the sunset provision underlines the
inequity of the scheme, so exporters should press an APA claim to
force the modification of the enforcement regulations as they
otherwise would not have a remedy under either international or
domestic law.
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Appellate Report, supra note 21, ¶¶ 286–88.
E.g., ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING
SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT, supra note 136, at 45.
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